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1)  Introduction 
 
What explains why some countries are rich today and some poor? Research has established 
that the most important factor is the quality of a country’s institutions (Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Hall and Jones, 1999; Rodrik et al., 2004).  Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that better 
institutions evolved where Europeans chose to settle, which tended to be in areas where 
their mortality rate was lower.  Using settlers’ mortality as an instrument for institutional 
quality, they show that geography, as measured by latitude, has no independent effect on 
per capita incomes, once institutional quality is controlled for. 
 
This view has been challenged by Sachs (2003) and Olsson and Hibbs (2005).  Sachs 
shows that geographical factors remain significant if they are represented by an index of 
the risk of fatal malaria rather than by latitude. Rodrik et al. (2004) confirm this result, 
although in their view its significance is limited because malaria risk ceases to be 
statistically significant once a dummy for sub-Saharan Africa is included. 
 
Our particular focus here is the contribution of Olsson and Hibbs (2005) [OH].  Inspired by 
the work of Diamond (1997), OH argue that countries endowed with favourable 
biogeography in prehistoric times, as indicated by a greater variety of domesticable large 
animals and wild grasses suitable for cultivation, made the transition to agriculture at an 
earlier date.  An early transition gave these countries a lead in economic development that 
they have never entirely lost, contrary to the “reversal of fortune” argument of Acemoglu et 
al. (2002).
1  Although catching up with and overtaking other countries is possible, OH 
argue (p. 927) that “regions with a well-endowed natural environment, which consequently 
made the transitions to agriculture and industry comparatively early, should other things 
equal have higher per capita today than more poorly endowed regions where the transitions 
came later.”  They develop an index of biological conditions conducive to agriculture, and 
in the empirical section of their paper they show that this is strongly positively correlated 
with current per capita GDP and the date of transition to sedentary agriculture.
2   
 
                                                 
1 To be precise, Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that the reversal of fortune applies only to ex-colonies and not 
to all countries.  We return to this point later. 
2  Their index of biological conditions is the first principal component of two variables: the number of wild 
grasses with a mean kernel weight exceeding 10mg known to exist in prehistory, and the number of 
domesticable mammal species weighing more than 45g known to exist in prehistory.  
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This hypothesis suggests that geography works through history, by setting favoured 
countries on the path to development earlier. A limitation of OH’s empirical work is that 
their dating of the transition to agriculture, which is based on Diamond (1997), is very 
imprecise and estimated only down to the regional level, as we discuss further below.  
Recently much more detailed estimates of the timing of this transition have been provided 
by Putterman and Trainor (2006), and these estimates differ quite substantially from those 
used by OH.  Since the timing of the transition to sedentary agriculture is the crucial link in 
the Diamond-Olsson-Hibbs thesis, it is important to establish whether their theory is 
supported by the new data.   
 
This is the issue which we address in this paper. First, we test whether the strong 
correlation between prehistoric biogeographical conditions and transition dates still holds 
with the Putterman-Trainor data. Then we test the second link in the argument, that current 
per capita income is correlated with the timing of the agricultural transition (OH do not 
actually test this, but only the correlation between prehistoric biogeography and current 
income).  Third, we incorporate institutional quality along the lines of previous work, and 
we show that the time elapsed since the agricultural transition is a significant determinant 
of current per capita income even after controlling for institutions and other geographical 
variables. Fourth, we show that adding prehistoric biogeographical conditions to the 
regression does not improve the fit, indicating that the date of the agricultural transition is 
not simply acting as a proxy for some omitted geographical variable.  In short, our findings 
are favourable to the Diamond-OH hypothesis.  Finally, we consider whether the date of 
the agricultural transition is less significant for countries that were colonies for many 
centuries, as is implied by Acemoglu et al.’s (2002) argument that poorer colonies have 
overtaken initially richer ones because of their more “European” institutions. 
 
The paper is organized in the following way.  In Section Two we discuss the new data on 
the transition to sedentary agriculture and test the correlation of transition dates with 
biogeographical conditions at the time.  In Section Three we introduce the model and data 
that we use to test the relationship between the date of the agricultural transition and 
current per capita income. Because of possible endogeneity of some of the independent 
variables, in Section Four we describe our empirical strategy in some detail. Section Five 
shows the main empirical results, whose robustness is tested in Section Six. In Section  
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Seven we consider the evidenc for a “reversal of fortune” amongst early colonies. The 
paper ends with a short conclusion. 
 
2) Transition to Agriculture and Biogeography 
 
The starting point of our paper is the availability of new data on the transition from a 
hunter-gatherer existence to sedentary agriculture. Putterman and Trainor (2006) have 
produced detailed estimates of the timing of the transition to sedentary agriculture in 163 
countries, using as the criterion the point at which the calorific intake from domesticated 
plants and animals is estimated first to have exceeded 50%.  These estimates are a great 
improvement on those used by OH, who ascribe the transition in 112 countries to one of 
only six dates, ranging from 9847 years ago (all of Europe) to 4960 years ago (all African 
countries). Moreover in the OH data “neo-European” countries (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the USA) are rather arbitrarily ascribed the European transition date. 
 
Table 1 shows some basic statistics relating to Putterman and Trainor’s estimates.  As is 
well known, the earliest transition took place in the Middle East, on average almost 9000 
years ago. African and Latin American countries experienced the most recent transition, 
almost 3000 years ago. The average West European and Asian country made the transition 
almost 5,500 years ago. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Transition to Agriculture 
Continent               Mean                Std. Dev.              Min         Max 
  
Africa                               3001                    1170                       1000  7200 
 
Latin America                    3043                    1078                         800               4300 
 
Asia                               5600                       1487                       4000   9000 
  
Eastern Europe                  6500                        1282                       3700  8000 
 
Western + New Europe    5450                         2389                         400             10000 
      
Middle East                8820                        1303                        7500             10500 
Notes: years before the present (source: Putterman and Trainor, 2006). New Europe is Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and USA. 
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Table 2 compares the transition dates estimated by OH and Putterman and Trainor (2006) 
[PT].  Descriptive statistics for the OH measure of prehistoric biogeographical conditions 
are also shown. The mean year of the transition according to PT was 4800 years ago (4336 
years ago for the countries covered by HO), compared to 7420 according to OH. The 
standard deviation are respectively 2440 and 2208. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Transition Dates 
Variable Countries  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
       
Agricultural Transition (PT)  163  4808  2440  362  10500 
Agricultural Transition 
(PT estimates; OH sample)  108  4335  2325  362  10500 
Agricultural  Transition  (OH)  112  7420 2208 4959 9846 
Prehistoric  biogeography  (OH)  112  47.48 39.65 12.35 100 
       
Notes: Agricultural transition is the years elapsed since the estimated date of transition; prehistoric 
biogeography is a measure of the number of species of domesticable large animals and wild plants.  PT – 
Putterman and Trainor (2006); OH – Olsson and Hibbs (2005). 
 
                              Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
  ln Agric (PT)  ln Agric (HO)  ln Biogeography 
      
ln Agricultural T. (PT)  1     
ln Agricultural T. (Hibbs-Olsson)  0.5767  1   
ln Biogeography (Hibbs-Olsson)  0.5468  0.9666  1 
      
 
Table 3 shows the pairwise correlation between biogeography and the date of the transition 
to agriculture. The correlation between the OH and PT transition dates is only 0.58, which 
reflects the much more detailed character of PT’s estimates. The correlation between the 
transition date and the index of biogeography is extremely high for the OH data, at 0.97, 
and rather lower for the PT data (0.55), but this is still highly significant (t=6.66).  Thus the 
first stage of the OH hypothesis, that the agricultural transition was favoured by the 
availability of domesticable large animals and cultivable wild plant species, is still 
supported by the PT transition data.               
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3) Data and Model  
 
The hypothesis which we wish to test in this paper is whether an earlier transition to 
agriculture has caused a lasting advantage in per capita income, once controls for the other 
deep determinants of the current level of development – the quality of institutions, 
geographical factors, and trade integration - are entered in the model. To put it another 
way, does the inclusion of the timing of the agricultural transition enable us to improve on 
the models estimated by Rodrik et al. (2004), who conduct rigorous econometric tests of 
the competing hypotheses? 
 
The model which we estimate for a cross-country sample can be written as: 
 
Log(y)= α + β1 AT + β2 GEO + β3 QI + β4 TR + υ         (1) 
 
where AT represents the timing of the transition to sedentary agriculture, GEO represents 
one or more geographical factors, QI is a measure of the quality of institutions, TR 
represents openness to international trade, and y is income per capita on a purchasing 
power parity basis for the year 2000, estimates for which come from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.  Equation (1) is similar in form to that estimated by Rodrik 
et al. (2004), but with the addition of the agricultural transition variable. 
 
The variable AT is our measure of how long ago the transition to agriculture was estimated 
to occur, so a higher value represents an earlier transition. More precisely the variable is 
equal to the logarithm of the cumulative number of years before 2000 C.E. (A.D.) at which 
countries are supposed to have made the transition, as estimated by Putterman and Trainor 
(2006). 
 
Geographical variables that have been used in cross-country growth analysis include a 
dummy for access to the sea, the proportion of a country that lies within the tropics, 
exposure to the risk of fatal malaria, latitude and European settlers’ mortality (introduced 
by Acemoglu et al., 2001). Geographical variables have a dual function in equations like 
(1), because at least one of them is invariably used as an instrument for institutional quality.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) use settlers’ mortality for this purpose.   
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We replace settlers’ mortality with latitude, since tests show that it is a superior 
instrument;
3 the use of latitude as an instrument also avoids truncation of the sample 
through lack of settlers’ mortality data for some countries.  The geographical variables 
included in the regression are the risk of fatal malaria (the contribution of regionally 
dominant vector mosquitoes to the potential transmission intensity of malaria) as used by 
Sachs (2003) and a measure of access to the sea (the ratio of a country’s continental shelf 
area
4 to its surface area), which is similar to a dummy for sea access but allows for more 
variation across countries. Data on the continental shelf area are provided by Pruett and 
Cimino (2000) and published by the UNEP. 
 
To proxy institutions we use two alternative indices. The first one is an index of property 
rights protection from Gwartney and Lawson (2006), as published by the Fraser Institute. 
The second measure, which is available for considerably more countries, is an index of the 
rule of law
5 supplied by Kaufmann et al. (2005) and published by the World Bank. Finally, 
trade as a ratio of GDP at current prices is used as a measure of the openness of the 
country. Data are collected from Heston and Summers (2006) (PWT 6.2). 
 
4)  Empirical Strategy 
 
Although in equation (1) geographical factors and the elapsed time since the transition to 
agriculture can reasonably be considered exogenous to current per capita income, the same 
cannot be said for institutions and trade integration.  The problem is to find plausible 
instruments for these variables. Like Rodrik et al. (2004), we use the predicted trade shares 
estimated by Frankel and Romer (1999) [FR] as an instrument for openness to international 
trade.  As already mentioned, we use latitude as an instrument for institutional quality. 
 
                                                 
3 Settlers’ mortality tends to fail the Stock-Yogo test for weak instruments, implying that it is insufficiently 
correlated with institutional quality. 
4 The shelf area is defined as "the extended perimeter of each continent and associated coastal plain, which is 
covered during interglacial periods such as the current epoch by relatively shallow seas (known as shelf seas) 
and gulfs. The shelf usually ends at a point of increasing slope (called the shelf break). The sea floor below 
the break is the continental slope. broad, relatively shallow submarine platform that forms a border to a 
continent"(Wikipedia). 
5 “Rule of law combines several indicators that measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non-violent 
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Table 4: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
  Open  Law  P. Rights  Agric. T  Shelf A. Latit. 
F.&R. 
Trade Temper  Frost Eurofrac  Wet 
                 
Openness  1.0000                  
Rule of Law  0.2791 1.0000                     
Prop. Rights  0.2787 0.8919 1.0000                   
Agric. Transit.  0.0856 0.0286 0.1141  1.0000                 
Shelf Area  0.1664 -0.0344  0.1328  -0.0781  1.0000               
Latitude  0.0991 0.5025 0.6611  0.3951  -0.1326  1.0000             
F.& R. Trade  0.5625 0.1741 0.1770  0.0650  0.1921 -0.0318  1.0000           
Temperature  -0.0672 -0.3737 -0.5415  -0.3185  0.1223  -0.8651 0.1714   1.0000        
Frost Days  0.0480 0.3042 0.4949  0.3115  -0.0929  0.8140 -0.1859    -0.9526  1.0000       
Euro-Fraction  -0.0246 0.3437  0.1610  -0.3337  -0.0463 -0.0369 -0.0085    0.0415  -0.0759  1.0000     
Wet Days  0.2613 0.1988 0.0748  -0.1303  0.0753 -0.0121  0.1223    -0.1491  0.1188  0.3080  1.0000 
 
In Table 4 we show the pairwise correlation between presumed endogenous variables and 
some of the possible instruments. Latitude has a stronger correlation with property rights 
and rule of law than any other variable. Measures of the share of population speaking 
English or other European languages (introduced by Hall and Jones, 1999, and used by 
Rodrik et al., 2004, in some regressions) do not have a particularly large correlation with 
institutions. The FR predicted trade share is significantly correlated with trade openness. 
Consequently we use latitude as the main instrument for institutions and the FR predicted 
trade share as an instrument for integration. We show below that these variables pass the 
Stock-Yogo (2005) test for weak instruments. In the first-stage regressions, measures of 
institutions and trade integration are regressed on all the exogenous variables, and as a 
consequence our first stage regressions can be written as: 
 
 
INSTi = θi + δ1Agric.i + δ2Geoi + δ3 FR. Tradei + δ4 Latitude.i + μi         (2) 
 
OPENi=  ηi + λ1 Agric.i  + λ2 Geoi + λ3 FR. Tradei + λ4 Latitude.i + εi        (3) 
 
5)  Results  
 
Table 5 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) results for equation (1), using property rights 
(Model 1) and the rule of law (Model 2) as the measure of institutional quality.  The sample 
size is considerably larger when rule of law is used, but the results are fairly similar.    
 
8    
Institutional quality is easily the most significant variable, particularly in Model 2. An 
earlier transition to agriculture (AT) is associated with a higher current per capita income, 
and the effect is significant at the 0.01 level. In Models 3 and 4 we add fatal malaria risk as 
an explanatory variable. This index (originally called malaria ecology) was developed by 
Kizsewski et al. (2004) and measures “the contribution of regionally dominant vector 
mosquitoes to the potential transmission intensity of malaria”.  It is not simply a measure 
of the probability of dying of malaria (which is likely to be affected by the quality of 
medical and other public services and therefore by per capita income), but attempts to 
capture the exogenous environmental component of this (Sachs, 2003, uses it as an 
instrument for malaria fatalities). Fatal malaria risk is highly (negatively) significant, and 
its inclusion reduces the estimated magnitude of the AT effect, although AT is still 
significant at the 5% level. 
 
However, because OLS is not consistent in the presence of endogenous variables, we run 
the augmented Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to check whether institutions and trade are truly 
endogenous, using latitude and FR trade shares as the potential instruments. In this test, 
residuals from the first stage of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation are added to the 
OLS equations shown in Table 5, and the null of exogeneity is rejected if the fit 
significantly improves.  The results suggest that there is a problem of endogenous 
regressors in all models except Model 4. 
 
Accordingly in Table 6, we show the 2SLS estimates of the same equations, treating both 
institutions and openness as endogenous.  Panel A of Table 6 shows the second-stage 
results, and Panel B shows the first-stage regressions for each endogenous variable, which 
indicate that latitude and FR trade shares are very strong instruments for institutional 
quality and trade openness respectively. 
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Table 5: OLS Estimates for the Income Level Model 
Dependent Variable: ln per capita Income (2000) PPP adjusted 
ESTIMATION METHOD:   OLS 
COEFFICIENTS 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Institutional Quality (Property Rights)  0.463***   0.382***   
  (14.95)   (13.00)   
Institutional Quality (Rule of Law)   0.978***    0.881*** 
   (22.98)    (20.86) 
Log Agricultural Transition Date  0.295***  0.245***  0.190**  0.154** 
  (3.47) (3.83) (2.10)  (2.37) 
Shelf area/Surface Area  0.0357**  0.0369***  0.0568**  0.0494*** 
  (2.03) (4.08) (2.41)  (2.68) 
Log Openness  0.222*  0.147  0.285**  0.124 
  (1.78) (1.49) (2.42)  (1.36) 
Malaria  Risk    -0.0619***  -0.0436*** 
    (-8.44)  (-7.03) 
Constant  2.544*** 5.782*** 3.820***  6.793*** 
  (2.72) (8.01) (4.20)  (9.76) 
Endogeneity Test for Inst and Open.  (p-values)    0.0010               0.0338                 0.0889 0.2369 
Endogeneity Test for Institutions  (p-values)        0.1795 
Endogeneity Test for Openness  (p-values)      0.2333 
Observations  110 145 108  142 
Root  MSE  0.685 0.604 0.580  0.547 
R-squared  0.67 0.74 0.77  0.79 
1)Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity:  H0 = Constant variance (p-values):  0.0018  for Model 1;   0.0000 
for Model  2; 0.1113 for Model 3; and 0.0010 for Model 4. 
2) Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: 2SLS Estimates 
Dependent Variable: ln 2000 per capita income at PPP 
Independent variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Institutional Quality (Property Rights)  0.573***    0.443***   
 (12.15)    (10.38)   
Institutional Quality (Rule of Law)    1.172***    0.973*** 
   (12.74)    (9.95) 
Log Agricultural Transition Date  0.269***  0.171**  0.187**  0.134** 
 (3.17)  (2.48)  (2.12)  (2.01) 
Shelf Area/Surface Area  0.0486** 0.0492***  0.0639** 0.0506** 
 (2.17)  (3.73)  (2.20)  (2.22) 
Log Openness  -0.160  -0.230  0.0082  -0.100 
 (-0.70)  (-1.13)  (0.04)  (-0.56) 
Fatal Malaria Risk      -0.0553***  -0.0392*** 
     (-7.09)  (-5.40) 
Constant 3.743***  7.959***  4.648***  7.885*** 
 (3.33)  (7.81)  (4.42)  (8.51) 
        
Observations 100  120  98  117 
Cragg-Donald F statistic 25.94 41.77  (24.90)  (25.60) 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values for CD Statistic  (7.03)  (7.03)  7.03  7.03 
Anderson canon. statistic
2  43.58 37.88  42.39  44.38 
Hansen J statistic
  0.0000 0.000  0.0000  0.000 
Root MSE  0.73  0.64  0.59  0.56 
R-Squared 0.62  0.72  0.75  0.79 
Excluded Instruments  Latitude & Frankel-Romer trade shares. 
1) The Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic is a likelihood-ratio test of whether the equation is identified. Under the null 
the model is under-identified. Test not robust to heteroscedasticity. 
2) The Hansen J statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions.  The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are 
valid instruments, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
3) The figures  in parentheses are robust t-statistics; *, **,  ***: significant at 10, 5, and 1% respectively 
 
  Panel B: Firs- Stage Regressions 










Agricultural Transiton  -0593***  -0.153 -0.546**  -0.101   -0.015 -0.035 -0.008 -0.035 
  (-2.71) (-1.29) (-2.01) (-0.72)   (-0.27) (-0.68) (-0.12) (-0.59) 
Continental Shelf area  0.035  0.031*  0.077  0.090*   0.038*** 0.037*** 0.0428*  0.038* 
  (1.60) (1.91) (0.89) (1.75)   (4.41) (4.21) (1.86) (1.70) 
FR . Trade Share  0.403**  0.240**  0.409**  0.234**   0.429*** 0.431*** 0.433*** 0.440*** 
  (2.02) (2.37) (2.06) (2.22)   (7.57) (8.71) (7.47) (8.31) 
Latitude  0.088*** 0.043*** 0.086*** 0.040***    0.002 0.003 0.013 0.0016 
  (9.55) (8.97) (8.44) (7.56)   (0.51) (1.08) (0.37) (0.48) 
Malaria  Risk    -0.0067  -0.013*      -0.0004  -0.0062 
    (-0.43)  (-1.91)      (-0.06)  (-1.02) 
Constant 7.359***  -0.430  7.016***  -0.716   3.076*** 3.214*** 3.017*** 3.251*** 
 (3.96)  (-0.42)  (3.03)  (-0.59)    (7.30) (7.83) (5.82) (6.66) 
            
Partial R-squared  0.54  0.50  0.47 0.41   0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36 
Shea Partial R-squared  0.54  0.46  0.47 0.38   0.36 0.33 0.35 0.33 
The figures  in parentheses are robust t-statistics; *, **,  ***: significant at 10, 5, and 1% respectively 
 
Various test statistics indicate the adequacy of the instruments in Table 6. The Anderson 
statistic rejects the hypothesis of under-identification, while the Hansen J-statistic indicates  
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that the null of exact identification cannot be rejected. The Cragg-Donald F-statistic 
exceeds Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for two endogenous variables, which 
confirms that instruments and endogenous variables are strongly correlated, providing 
consistent estimates in the second stage.  The Shea partial R-squareds are also similar to the 
standard partial R-squareds from the first-stage regressions, which indicates that the 
instrument vectors are relatively uncorrelated.
6 
 
Compared to OLS estimates, the proxy for trade integration is the only variable which 
completely loses significance in the 2SLS models, although it keeps its sign. Our proxy for 
the elapsed time since the transition to agriculture is significant at a 1% level in Model 1 
and at 5% in Models 2 to 4. Its coefficient suggests that a transition to agriculture 10% 
earlier is associated with a per capita income between 1.3% (Model 4) and 2.7% (Model 1) 
higher today.  Although this sounds quite a small effect, it must be remembered that the 
dispersion of transition dates across countries is very wide. 
 
The first-stage regressions (reported in Panel B) suggest a negative correlation between 
institutional quality and the transition to agriculture (significant for property rights but not 
rule of law). This negative correlation is consistent with Acemoglu et al’s (2002) argument 
that the colonisation process resulted in a “reversal of fortune”, with poorer and less 
populated regions absorbing more European settlers and therefore having more “European” 
institutions.  We return to this point later. 
 
6) Further Analysis  
 
The results in Tables 5 and 6 support the Diamond-OH hypothesis that an earlier transition 
to agriculture is associated with higher per capita incomes today. Since, as we have already 
seen, the timing of the transition to agriculture is correlated with prehistoric biogeography, 
this result may just reflect some omitted geographical influences. To test this, in Table 7 we 
add the OH prehistoric biogeography variable to the regression.  If the true explanation for 
our previous results is an omitted geographical effect, it should outperform the agricultural 
transition variable. 
 
                                                 
6 If they were highly correlated, they would effectively little better than one instrument, in which case the 
model would be underidentified (Shea, 1996).  
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In Models 1 and 2 of Table 7 we first estimate a parsimonious version of Models 2 and 4 of 
Table 6, omitting the insignificant trade variable, which increases the number of 
observations, particularly in the case of the rule of law (to 143 instead of 120, and to 109 
rather than 100 for property rights). The agricultural transition variable now has a slightly 
larger coefficient (and t-statistic) than in the equivalent regressions in Table 6.  This is our 
reference model for the remainder of the paper. 
 
When we add prehistoric biogeography (Models 3 and 4 of Table 7), its coefficient is 
statistically insignificant and negative, while the AT coefficient even becomes more 
positive.  This suggests that the effect of prehistoric biogeography on current income does 
indeed work through the timing of the transition to sedentary agriculture, as the Diamond-
OH hypothesis suggests. 
 
 
Table 7: Adding Prehistoric Biogeography 
                                 Dependent Variable: ln 2000 per capita GDP (PPP)    
ESTIMATION METHOD:    2SLS  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
        
Institutional Quality (Property Rights)  0.450***    0.509***   
 (9.82)    (5.09)   
Institutional Quality (Rule of Law)    1.032***    1.092*** 
   (8.66)    (5.10) 
Log Agricultural Transition Date  0.208** 0.152**  0.305**  0.240* 
  (2.43) (2.31)  (2.25)  (1.87) 
Shelf Area / Surface Area  0.0654*** 0.0337  0.0691***  0.0494** 
  (2.84) (1.48)  (2.84)  (2.16) 
Fatal Malaria Risk  -0.0551*** -0.0375***  -0.0582***  -0.0386*** 
  (-6.84) (-4.95)  (-6.65)  (-5.00) 
Log Prehistoric Biogeography     -0.159  -0.131 
     (-0.79)  (-0.66) 
Constant  4.476*** 7.332***  3.852***  6.976*** 
  (5.65) (12.95) (3.58)  (11.21) 
        
Cragg-Donald F statistic  57.70 33.00  17.14  11.53 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values for CD Statistic  (7.03) (7.03)  (7.03)  (7.03) 
Anderson LR statistic  48.11 30.66  16.71  11.57 
Hansen J statistic   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Endogeneity test (p-values) 0.2831  0.1909  0.4383  0.5121 
Root MSE  0.59 0.55  0.60  0.53 
R-Squared  0.75 0.78  0.76  0.82 
Observations   109 143  89  106 
Instrument: Latitude  
1) See Notes to Table 6. Prehistoric Biogeography data are only available for 112 countries. 
4)  The figures  in parentheses are robust t-statistics;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We now perform some additional robustness checks. In Table 8 we use additional controls.  
First we include a dummy for oil producers.  Many oil producers are located in the Middle 
East, the region with the earliest transition to agriculture, so it is possible that the positive 
effect of the transition to agriculture really captures the effect of oil producers.
7 
 
A second possibility is that AT is capturing the negative effect of ethnic diversity. Several 
authors, such as Easterly and Levine (1997), find a negative effect of ethnic diversity on 
growth, and African countries, which mostly had a late transition to agriculture, also tend to 
have high ethnic diversity. We use the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index of Fearon 
and Laitin (2003). 
The third possibility that we entertain is that AT is just reflecting regional effects.  To 
control for this we add dummy variables for Latin American and Africa countries.  
 
Table 8 shows the results, first for property rights (Models 1 to 3), and then for the rule of 
law (Models 4 to 6).  The dummy for oil producers has a significant positive coefficient, 
but the AT coefficient remains significantly positive (Models 1 and 4).  Ethnic 
fractionalization is marginally significant for property rights and has a negative coefficient.  
The Latin America dummy is positive and significant, and the Africa dummy is negative 
and insignificant.  With the regional dummies AT remains significant at the 5% level 
(Models 3 and 6).  Only in Model 5 (ethnic fractionalizaton; rule of law) does AT cease to 
be significant at the 5% level, and ethnic fractionalization is highly insignificant in this 
regression, which suggests that this is the result of multicollinearity. 
 
In summary, the finding that the agricultural transition date is positively correlated with 
current per capita incomes seems to be robust. 
                                                 
7 We use data from the International Energy Agency to identify oil producers.  
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
 
 
7) A Reversal of Fortune? 
As mentioned earlier, Acemoglu et al. (2002) [AJR] have suggested that countries that 
were subject to European colonisation after 1500 have experienced a “reversal of fortune”, 
with the poorer ones tending to have higher per capita incomes today than those that were 
rich in 1500.  They argue that the quality of institutions established in the colonies reflected 
not just the disease environment, as reflected in settlers’ mortality (as they had previously 
argued in Acemoglu et al., 2001), but also the tendency to establish “extractive 
institutions” in areas of high population density such as Meso-America.  This argument 
suggests that any effect of the agricultural transition date on per capita income in these 
Dependent Variable: ln 2000 Per Capita GDP (PPP)  
ESTIMATION METHOD:  2SLS  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Institutional Quality (Property Rights)  0.463*** 0.430*** 0.504***     
  (10.57) (9.02)  (6.53)     
Institutional Quality (Rule of Law)      1.082*** 1.019*** 1.296*** 
       (9.12) (8.01) (9.44) 
Log Agricultural Transition Date  0.192**  0.175**  0.200**  0.147** 0.139*  0.247** 
 (2.16)  (2.12)  (1.96)  (2.01) (1.92) (2.21) 
Shelf Area / Surface Area  0.0656***  0.0684***  0.0633***  0.0293 0.0334 -0.122 
 (2.79)  (2.88)  (3.03)  (1.19) (1.44) (-1.38) 
Malaria Intensity  -0.051***  -0.044***  -0.0226*  -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.00895 
 (-5.96)  (-4.57)  (-1.76)  (-4.14) (-4.71) (-0.89) 
Oil Producers  0.300**      0.317**    
 (2.04)      (2.34)    
Ethnic Fractionalization    -0.550*     -0.163   
   (-1.84)     (-0.58)   
Latin America Dummy      0.400*    0.712*** 
     (1.69)    (3.14) 
Africa Dummy      -0.460    -0.160 
     (-1.63)    (-0.73) 
Constant 4.445***  5.030***  4.154***  7.292*** 7.498*** 6.433*** 
 (5.39)  (6.39)  (3.248)  (11.61) (11.60) (6.51) 
Cragg-Donald F statistic  55.15  56.38 22.93  32.23 31.83 38.17 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values for CD Stat.  (16.38) (16.38) (16.38)  (16.38) (16.38) (16.38) 
Anderson LR statistic  46.62  47.46 22.10  30.17 29.84 35.21 
Hansen J statistic   0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Endogeneity Test (p-values)  0.1828 0.3603 0.1356  0.0689 0.1785 0.0000 
Root  MSE  0.58 0.57 0.56  0.56 0.55 0.62 
R-Squared  0.75 0.77 0.77  0.78 0.78 0.72 







The figures  in parentheses are robust t-statistics;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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countries that existed in 1500 has since been erased by what happened in colonial times.  
Consequently the relationship between the agricultural transition date and current per capita 
incomes should be much weaker for ex-colonies, or at least for those that were colonised 
many centuries ago. 
 
To test this hypothesis we consider whether the AT coefficient varies across the sample.  In 
results that are not shown, we found that there was no significant difference between ex-
colonies and the rest. There is, however, a significant difference between early ex-colonies 
(those colonised before 1850) and the rest of the sample, as shown in Table 9.  The 
regressions in Table 9 are Models 1 and 2 of Table 7, with the addition of a dummy that is 
equal to one for a country that was colonised before 1850, and zero otherwise, and this 
dummy multiplied by AT.  The F-statistic shows that, in both cases (using either property 
rights or the rule of law as the measure of institutional quality), the null hypothesis that these 
two additional variables have zero coefficients can be rejected at the 5% level.  Moreover in 
both cases, the estimated coefficient of AT for early colonies is only about 0.1, much smaller 
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Table 9: Testing for Differences in Early Colonies 
Dependent Variable: 2000 GDP per capita  
ESTIMATION METHOD:  2SLS  Model 1  Model 2 
    
Institutional Quality (Property Rights)  0.483***   
 (7.22)   
Institutional Quality (Rule of Law)    1.112*** 
   (8.13) 
Log Agricultural Transition Date (AT)  0.488***  0.384*** 
 (2.69)  (3.18) 
EC Dummy * AT  -0.372  -0.276 
 (-1.40)  (-1.48) 
Shelf Area  0.0293  -0.00191 
 (1.18)  (-0.07) 
Fatal Malaria Risk  -0.0391***  -0.0247*** 
 (-3.80)  (-2.80) 
Pre-1850 Colonisation Dummy (EC)  3.396  2.592* 
 (1.58)  (1.71) 
Constant 1.777  5.257*** 
 (1.11)  (5.00) 
    
Endogeneity Test  0.2109  0.0906 
Cragg-Donald F-Statistic  36.27  26.73 
Stock-Yogo Critical Values for CD Statistic  (16.38)  (16.38) 
Anderson LR-Statistic  33.162  25.660 
Hansen J-Statistic  0.0000  0.000 
F-test  (EC & EC*AT coeffs=0) (p-value) 0.0373  0.0143 
Root MSE  0.57  0.56 
R-Squared 0.76  0.78 
Observations 109  143 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
If the agricultural transition date can be taken as an index of development in pre-colonial 
times, then the “reversal of fortune” hypothesis suggests that institutional quality should be 
negatively correlated with it, at least for the early colonies.  Table 10 shows regressions for 
institutional quality in the entire sample, allowing the AT coefficient to vary first between 
all ex-colonies and the rest (Models 3 and 4), and then between early colonies and the rest 
(Models 5 and 6).  In neither case is there evidence of a significant difference in the AT 
coefficient across the sample.  There tends to be a negative relationship between AT and 
institutional quality, but not a statistically significant one, and what stands out is the strong 
relationship between institutional quality and latitude. 
 
These results are only partially supportive of AJR’s argument.  Assuming that AT can be 
taken as an index of pre-colonial development, there is no evidence of the predicted strong  
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negative correlation with institutional quality, even for early colonies, and, although for per 
capita GDP the AT effect is much smaller in early colonies, it does not have the negative 
sign that the “reversal of fortune” thesis would suggest. 
 
Table 10: Determinants of Institutional Quality 
 
 OLS  ESTIMATES 
  Model 1  Model 3  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Dependent Variables:  Property R.  Rule of Law  Property R.  Rule of Law  Property R.  Rule of Law 
          
Log Agr. Transition Date  -0.316  -0.186 -0.624*  -0.235 0.0767  -0.223 
(AT) (-1.07)  (-1.38)  (-1.82)  (-1.45)  (0.18)  (-1.31) 
AC Dummy * AT      0.128  0.0437     
     (1.58)  (1.43)     
EC Dummy * AT          -0.959*  0.115 
         (-1.68)  (0.44) 
Shelf Area  0.141  0.147*  0.127  0.147*  0.0747  0.154* 
  (1.55) (1.74)  (1.28) (1.69)  (0.73) (1.78) 
Latitude 0.0725***  0.0304***  0.0708*** 0.0329***  0.0640*** 0.0317*** 
  (6.84) (5.78)  (4.66) (4.18)  (5.36) (5.24) 
Fatal Malaria Risk  -0.0107  -0.0111 -0.00690  -0.00944  -0.0159  -0.00973 
  (-0.69) (-1.55)  (-0.44) (-1.37)  (-0.78) (-1.20) 
Ex-Colony Dummy (AC)      -1.297*  -0.258     
     (-1.70)  (-0.70)     
Early Colony Dummy (EC)          7.507  -0.862 
         (1.58)  (-0.40) 
Constant   6.501***  0.634  9.202*** 0.900  3.556  0.887 
  (2.72) (0.59)  (2.97) (0.59)  (0.99) (0.66) 
          
F-test (p-values)      0.2333  0.7956     
F-test  (p-values)          0.0987  0.8074 
Observations  111 153  111 153  111 153 
Root  MSE  1.45 0.85  1.44 0.85  1.43 0.85 
R-squared  0.45 0.31  0.45 0.32  0.47 0.31 
      
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the null for the F-tests is that the two additional variables 
(relative to Model 1 or 2) have zero coefficients.   
 
8) Conclusions  
 
We have tested the Diamond-Olsson-Hibbs hypothesis that prehistoric biogeography 
determined the date of the transition to sedentary agriculture and thereby still influences per 
capita incomes today, using the rich data set on the timing of the transition provided by 
Putterman and Trainor (2006).  We confirm both elements of the hypothesis: the 
correlation between prehistoric biogeography and the transition to agriculture, and between  
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the timing of the transition to agriculture and current per capita incomes.  Our results are 
robust to alternative measures of institutional quality and of geographical factors, and to the 
inclusion of regional and other dummies.  There is a significantly weaker correlation 
between the timing of the agricultural transition and per capita income in early colonies, 
which is consistent with the Acemoglu et al. (2002) argument that the colonisation process 
led to faster development in the poorer regions, although we do not find evidence of an 
actual “reversal of fortune”.  An early transition to agriculture is not associated with better 
institutions, which are strongly correlated with latitude but little else.  
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Data Appendix 
 
Variable Source   
Cumulative Years Since the 
Transition to Agriculture 





Olsson and Hibbs (2005) 
www.douglas-hibbs.com 
 
Rule of Law  Kaufman et al. (2005) 
www.info.worldbank.org.governance/wgi/index.asp  
 
Property Rights  Gwartney and Lawson (2006) 
www.freetheworld.com  
 
Latitude, Population Share Speaking 





Continental Shelf Area  Pruett and Cimino (2000) 
www.unep.org/GEO/geo3/ 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/ 
 
Oil Producers  International Energy Agency 
www.esds.mcc.ac.uk/wds_iea/ 
 
Years of Colonisation  World Statesmen.org 
www.worldstatesmen.org 
 
GDP per Capita (2000) (PPP 
adjusted) 
World Bank. (World Development Indicators) 
www.esds.mcc.ac.uk/wds_wb/ 
 
Trade at Current Prices  Heston and Summers (2006) (Penn World Table 6.2) 
www.pwt.econ.upenn.edu  
 
Frankel and Romer Trade Shares  Frankel and Romer (1999). Appendix to the Paper. 
 
Average Temperature, Frost Days 
and Wet Days 
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